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From a naturalistic perspective on mental illness, depression is often described in
terms of biological dysfunctions, while a normative perspective emphasizes the lived
experience of depression as a harmful condition. The paper relates a conceptual analysis
of “depressive situation” to an analysis of the lived experience of depression. As such,
it predominantly aims to specify depression as a harmful condition in lights of normative
perspective on mental disorder, but partially refers to empirical research, i.e., naturalistic
perspective on depression, to exemplarily stress on the methodological merits and limits
of relating phenomenological considerations closer to empirical research. The depressive
situation is further speciﬁed with an examination of the evaluative dynamics by which
individuals meaningfully relate to themselves, others and the world. These evaluative
dynamics emerge out of the interplay of pre-reﬂective and reﬂective processes, which
are signiﬁcantly altered in depression. Such alterations of the evaluative structure are
inextricably intertwined with signiﬁcant distortions of practical sense in depression. From a
phenomenological perspective, these distortions of practical sense show in characteristic
experiences of evaluative incoherence and impairments of agency. Finally, this paper
focuses on an examination of “evaluative incapacity,” which has the integrative potential to
capture a range of typical changes ofmeaningful relatedness that determine the depressive
situation.
Keywords: depression, existential situation, experiential synthesis, practical sense, habitus, narrativity, evaluative
coherence, caring
INTRODUCTION
The paper aims to concretize some phenomena involved in
depression, according to which it is conceptualized as harmful
condition from a normative perspective. Rather than positioning
my analysis of the depressive situation in fundamental opposi-
tion to the value-neutral perspective on depression provided by
naturalism, it rather afﬁrms the value of both perspectives from
a methodological perspective. Although a conceptual analysis
and phenomenological considerations of the depressive situation
clearly face some methodological limitations in accounting for the
empirical research on depression, this approach might indicate an
alternative view on depression that can also inform naturalistic
accounts. The lived experience of depression is often neglected in
the descriptions of depression in terms of biological dysfunctions
(cf. Jacobs andWalter, 2011). This can be counterbalanced in relat-
ing empirical research on depression closer to phenomenological
considerations, for instance, in relating an analysis of particular
depressive experience to those theories that aim to provide the
neuropsychological correlates to it. Inasmuch as my analysis of
changes in the evaluative experience of self and world in depres-
sion is exemplarily substantiated by autobiographic narratives, this
illustrates, in which ways depressive experience differs in many
respects from non-depressive encounters with the world. From a
phenomenological perspective on depression, these narratives are
authentic expressions of the lived experience of depression and for
this reason also provide an additional diagnostic value for clinical
diagnosis. The reported phenomena in depressionnarratives point
beyond the well-known clinical cluster of classiﬁcatory criteria
for depression. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and International Classiﬁcation of
Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10; WHO, 2010) criteria of depres-
sion often do not reﬂect the experiential heterogeneity, as well
as the subtle differences in the experience of depression. Such
phenomena, which are neither captured by the clinical diagnos-
tic manuals, nor become transparent as lived experiences from a
naturalistic perspective, are, for instance, signiﬁcant changes in
one’s sense of reality, alterations in the experience of one’s abilities
(changes of practical sense), as well as a range of other experiential
alterations in one’s sense of meaningful relatedness to the world.
Consequently, my analysis aims to enrich the clinical picture of
depression drawn by the DSM or ICD with respect to a more
detailed analysis of the underlying evaluative dynamics that shape
the depressive situation. In doing so itmay contribute to a reconcil-
iation of the scientiﬁc and everyday characterization of depressive
symptoms, and may show how a normative understanding of
depression as illness completes a naturalistic conceptualization of
depression as disease1.
Before explaining the particular evaluative dynamics that
underlie these experiences in depression in greater detail, one can
start with some conceptual considerations on the term“existential
situation,” which addresses those processes in which individuals
situate themselves in the world in a particular evaluative way.
1For a detailed discussion of the distinction of “illness” and “disease,” see Boorse
(1975) and Schramme (2003).
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 429 | 1
“fpsyg-04-00429” — 2013/7/16 — 10:07 — page 2 — #2
Jacobs The depressive situation
But how are individuals situated by the ongoing dynamics of
evaluative self- and world-disclosure that emerge out of the gen-
eral interaction between organism and world? It is assumed that
these dynamics are the structural prerequisite placing individu-
als already in some sort of meaningful relation to the world. This
bond of meaningful relatedness, this structure, which is instanti-
ated by and maintained in proceeding evaluative experience and
practice, points to the inherently evaluative dimension of self-
and world-disclosure, thus, to the normative depths of existential
situatedness.
With the concept of “depressive situation,” I allude to what Karl
Jaspers has coined border situation (German: Grenzsituation), a
notion which can be used to describe psychiatric disorders as an
exceptional state of existence, converting “situations of daily life”
(German: Alltagssituationen) to border situations, inasmuch as
fundamental alterations of evaluative processes of self- and world-
disclosure are involved (cf. Jaspers, 1925, 1973; Jacobs and Thome,
2003; Fuchs, 2008). The concept of evaluative self- and world-
disclosure (German: Selbst- und Welt-Erschließung) allows us to
refer to those evaluative processes in which things in the world,
other people and also (aspects of) oneself andone’s actions become
intelligible to someone by virtue of being part of a world that pro-
vides a background of meaning to one’s (practical) encounters
(cf. Kompridis, 2006). The main hypothesis of this paper is, that
the existential situation of the depressive type – the depressive
situation – is characterized by such structural changes in evalua-
tive processes, which contribute to characteristic experiences and
modes of enaction that differ signiﬁcantly from non-depressive
ones. These dynamics of self- and world-disclosing signiﬁcantly
alter in depression, i.e., what appears as intelligible to one often
dramatically changes indepression: depressedpersons often report
that they feel disconnected from the world, that it appears as
an empty place deprived of all meaning, that other people and
activities formerly enjoyed are no longer of interest, that they get
stuck in deliberative processes of rumination and indecisiveness,
etc. Inasmuch as the sheer variety of experiences symptomatic
of depression cannot become fully addressed here, I predomi-
nantly focus on conceptual considerations about evaluative self-
and world-disclosure. These may prepare the grounds for testing,
which particular experiences and clinical symptoms point to an
inherently evaluative problematic of the depressive situation.
EXISTENTIAL SITUATION – THE DYNAMICS OF EVALUATIVE
SELF- AND WORLD-DISCLOSURE
For a start, it has to be mentioned that in contrast to approaches
suggesting affective intentionality as the conceptual core of mean-
ingful self-world-relatedness (Stephan and Slaby, 2011), or which
focus predominantly on feelings as providing this evaluative struc-
ture formodes of relatedness (Ratcliffe, 2008), I argue for a broader
notion of intentionality, which can account for a greater variety of
evaluative modes that structure one’s existential situation in gen-
eral, and by which in particular he heterogeneity of changes in
depressive evaluation, and not just particular changes of affect,
is addressed. It is assumed that processes of evaluative self- and
world-disclosure cannot be reduced to or equated with a mere
affective (or:“felt”) dimension, albeit affectivity (e.g., experiencing
an emotional episode) certainly has a self- and world-disclosing
function and, as such, provides one way to address a certain mode
of evaluative self-world-relation, respectively (cf. Jacobs, 2013a).
To argue for a broader notion of intentionality then also implies
to consider the whole bodily corporal dimension as irremissibly
constitutive of particularmodes of meaningful relatedness (cf. e.g.,
Ratcliffe, 2009; Fuchs et al., 2010). This likewise does not imply to
restrict the self- and world-disclosing function of the lived body
to a pure feeling dimension in terms of affectivity. Evaluative self-
and world-disclosure through the lived body neither depletes in
affective states, nor does it solely rest on felt evaluations (cf. Helm,
2002). Rather the dynamic interplay of thesewith different types of
incorporated social structures (e.g., values) and particular“knowl-
edge” (practical skills, unconscious desires, embodied memories,
etc.) has to be reconsidered as signiﬁcantly contributing to the
respective modes of evaluative relatedness provided by the bodily
corporal dimension.
Generally, the body as Körper expresses several forms of
incorporated practice or roles, e.g., an actor can, for instance,
incorporate (verkörpern) a certain role.While this kind of incorpo-
ration is rather the product of intentional processes (e.g., learning
to incorporate a role), there are also speciﬁc forms of incorpora-
tion that“enter”the body through social structures, education, etc.,
which rather tacitly shape our situation as embodied individuals.
Contrastingly, the Leib is the lived body, the transparent medium
for world-disclosure that enables us to engage with the world
(cf. Jäger, 2004). Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of embodied practice
paradigmatically outlines how external (social, cultural, moral)
structures become incorporated in a literal sense. With his notion
of habitus, he has elaborated individual (pre-)dispositions in terms
of an embodied, embedded and enacted perspective on individual
situatedness (cf. Bourdieu, 1979, 1980). This reading of embodied
practice is the presupposed rationale for my analysis of the eval-
uative dynamics of psychopathological self- and world-disclosure
(cf. Jacobs, 2012, p. 251, 2013a).
Inasmuch as it is rather the complex interplay of different types
of evaluations and evaluative states – which together contribute
to how someone actually experiences a speciﬁc situation, and is
directed toward the world and others in a meaningful way – this
interplay can be further explained by the procedural dynamics
of evaluative processes. These considerations provide the pre-
requisites for the analysis of how these procedural dynamics of
evaluative processes change in depression, and how this, in return,
contributes to characteristic changes of meaningful relatedness.
PRE-REFLECTIVE AND REFLECTIVE PROCESSES
Generally, the procedural dynamics of evaluative self- and world-
disclosure can be speciﬁed in pointing to the particular interplay
of the pre-reﬂective and reﬂective sphere of one’s existential situa-
tion (cf. Jacobs, 2012, 202ff). The pre-reﬂective sphere is – broadly
construed – that according to which all intentional encounters
with the world are pre-structured by a set of individual predispo-
sitions (for instance perceptional schemes, embodied skills, tastes,
capabilities, etc.). It has its counterpart in a sphere of reﬂection,
while it is particularly by self-reﬂexive processes2 that individuals
2Normally, self-reﬂection is understood as a mode of intentionality that improves
one’s practice in the future through a retrospective analysis of action. The difference
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structure their life as autonomous agents (cf. Jacobs, 2012, 175ff;
pp. 221–229; 242ff).
These modes of self-directedness in acts of reﬂection, of course,
form a special kind of evaluative self-relation, which differs from
that provided by the pre-reﬂective sphere: inasmuch as individuals
are able to develop an objective stance (German: Haltung) toward
their own beliefs, desires, feelings, behaviors and actions, it is in
virtue of their self-reﬂexive capacity that they situate themselves as
autonomous agents in ﬁelds of social (e.g., moral, cultural, etc.)
practice (cf. Rothacker, 1941, 55ff; Jaspers, 1973, 203). In con-
trast to theories of practice, in which the self-reﬂexive stance and
associated rational strategies of self-constitution, for instance, in
deliberative processes play rather a secondary role (e.g., Bourdieu,
1979), one can emphasize the experiential and practical modes
of meaningful relatedness provided by these. This implies that a
person can inﬂuence by which particular evaluative stance, and by
which particular modes of practice, she relates to herself, others
and the world. These modes of being directed to the world (and
others) then have their vital counterpart in the evaluative modes
of self- and world-disclosure provided by the pre-reﬂective sphere.
Both spheres equally contribute to how one’s existential situation
enfolds in the procedural dynamics of evaluation. Consequently,
the depressive situation can be explained by focusing on structural
changes of evaluative processes that take place on the pre-reﬂexive
and reﬂective/self-reﬂexive level.
THE INTERPLAY OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF EVALUATION
If one aims to account for the interplay of different types of eval-
uations that equally shape particular evaluative experiences and
modes of meaningful relatedness, and if one further stresses the
complex evaluative phenomenality and intentionality provided by
the dynamics of both spheres, one has to differentiate at least
those types of evaluations that rather refer to a pre-reﬂective
sphere, from those that predominantly structure the more reﬂec-
tive encounters with the world: the pre-reﬂective sphere provides
one with an experiential structure and particular modes for self-
world-relation that can be described as stemming from rather
spontaneous and immediate evaluations (e.g., in terms of bod-
ily appraisals). Often this pre-reﬂective sphere is described as
an evaluative dimension, which rather tacitly structures one’s
daily encounters with the world. This evaluative “rather taken
for granted-structure” has been speciﬁed, for instance, in terms
of basic existential feelings (cf. Ratcliffe, 2008; Jacobs et al., 2013).
These background orientations provide one with a basic sense of
belonging or a sense of reality, thus, with an evaluative struc-
ture that normally is rather the unquestioned evaluative basis
for the more reﬂective processes of self- and world-disclosure.
They come to the focus of someone’s attention especially when
they signiﬁcantly alter, e.g., due to a slight experiential fracture of
one’s sense of reality as in a déjà vu-experience. Other classes of
evaluative types that rather seem to belong to the pre-reﬂective
realm are, for instance, incorporated memories and unconscious
desires.
to “self-reﬂexivity” becomes relevant with regard to when this process of introspec-
tion exactly takes place, as self-reﬂexivity refers to the ongoing evaluative process, for
instance in deliberation.
What unites all these different types of pre-reﬂective evalua-
tions is that they have to be reconsidered for their constitutive role
for agency, i.e., as (partially) constitutive of self-reﬂexive evaluative
processes. The discrimination of a pre-reﬂective vs. reﬂective eval-
uative sphere of one’s existential situation thus is a purely analytical
one, as this paper emphasizes the dynamic interplay of both spheres
that establish the evaluative processes – the evaluative structure –
by which the meaningful bonds between self and world emerge.
Claiming a primacy of self-reﬂexive evaluative processes for (e.g.,
moral) self-constitution as agent does not imply to dismiss that
both classes of evaluations contribute to such structurally complex
modes of evaluative directedness.
THE SYNTHESIS-VIEW – THE INTEGRATIVE UNITY OF
EVALUATIVE EXPERIENCE
It may have become transparent that it is by experiencing a par-
ticular type of evaluative state (e.g., a desire) that we are already
directed to the world and, as such, imbue the world with meaning.
Consequently, the intentional and the phenomenal dimension are
no longer separable in evaluative processes, but rather must be
conceptualized as essentially uniﬁed in the evaluative experiences of
self and world.
Fromwhat has been said so far follows that the particular evalu-
ative modes of existential situatedness can be characterized neither
solely in terms of mental states (mere intentionalism), as the con-
cept of intentionality has beenbroadenedby considering thewhole
bodily corporal dimension of individuals as something essential to
the respective (evaluative) experience itself. Nor are the evaluative
modes by which the self-world-relation is instantiated are under-
stood as just being comprised of separable components, whose
relational connection often raises conceptual problems. From the
perspective of such component theories, evaluative states (e.g.,
emotions) are described as having a certain kind of intention-
ality (world-to-mind/mind-to-world/direction of ﬁt/or both, in
being“janus-faced”cf. de Sousa, 2002) plus an other component to
account for the phenomenological dimension of evaluative states.
Whatever might be considered to be a deﬁning factor of a cer-
tain type of evaluation seems to be simply added on as a further
component to its intentional content.
One might object that my account faces this common problem,
in failing to provide the required sufﬁcient explanation of the
interrelation of the components by which a particular type of
evaluative state (for instance, an emotion) must be comprised.
And inasmuch as different types of evaluations amount to the
more complex evaluative meta-structure of one’s actual existential
situation, one has to present a theory that equally can account for
the structural connectivity of evaluative content, too.
This can be tackled the following way: rather than focusing on
an analysis of how these “components” either combine to consti-
tute a particular evaluative state, or how different evaluative types
exactly must be combined to form more complex evaluative pat-
terns, these factors must not be treated as disjointed components:
neither for the case of a particular evaluative state, nor for the
case of a complex evaluative pattern, which structurally integrates
the phenomenality and intentionality of more than one evaluative
type in the process of evaluative experience. One can rather aim
to explain, how these elements are necessarily interrelated due to
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a synthesis of evaluative experience. This “synthesis-view” aims to
take the phenomenology and intentionality as an integrative unity
in evaluative experience fully into account3 . Then the various
“aspects” of being, for instance, in a particular type of evaluative
state are perceived rather as dimensions of the unifying structure of
evaluative experience itself. If one expands the synthesis-view, one
can address the structural complexity of someone’s actual evalu-
ative situation as a whole: the different types of pre-reﬂective and
reﬂective evaluation thereby are perceived as building the struc-
ture of more complex evaluative patterns by which several types
of evaluative content become integrated. This means that differ-
ent types of evaluations (e.g., desire, emotion, or the normative
evaluation in case of belief, etc.) become structurally related with
each other to form a more complex evaluative pattern for evalu-
ative self- and world-disclosure. With this, one can conceptually
address the evaluative totality, and, simultaneously, the procedural
dynamics of evaluative self- and world-disclosure.
NARRATIVITY AS THE STRUCTURING PRINCIPLE OF
EVALUATIVE EXPERIENCE
But one may still ask how such a structuring principle that guaran-
tees for the experiential unity in processes of evaluative self- and
world-disclosure may be described. This has to be explained in
more detail, as I argue in the following steps that many forms of
depressive experience can be explained due to fragmentations of
this experiential unity.
THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF EVALUATIVE EXPERIENCE
This is exemplarily outlined in Voss (2004, 185ff) thoughtful
narrative account, in which she elegantly solves the component
problem for the particular subclass of evaluative states, namely
the emotions. In her analysis, evaluative narratives are carefully
distinguished from narration. While “narration” is the result of
purposivewriting and speech, the evaluative narrative is themean-
ingful structure, which can become the object of a narration.
Insofar as narration is an appropriate medium for transporting
evaluative content, one can argue, in line with her account, for the
narrative structure of evaluative experience in general. This plays a
constitutive role for uniting phenomenality and intentionality in
evaluative experience: narration is then the appropriate or inap-
propriate description of a desire, belief, (bodily) feeling, emotion,
etc., which already points to the narrative structure of the par-
ticular evaluative content of a speciﬁc evaluation. More precisely:
it points to the evaluative narrative as the situational instantia-
tion of the formal object of a certain kind of evaluative type. The
proposition of an evaluative content is never isolated from a corre-
sponding,more detailed narrative structure of a speciﬁc evaluative
state. Accordingly, the idea of a narrative structure of evaluative
states suggests, that one therein refers to the speciﬁc evaluative
content and structure of these states. As such, one refers to certain
3I have elsewhere provided an answer in terms of a synthesis-account in order to
tackle some problems of classic cognitivist and component theories of emotion (cf.
Jacobs et al., 2013). This has been the background for claiming that an adequate
theory of evaluation in general – and not only theories of emotions – has to explain
both, the intentionality and phenomenology of evaluation (cf. Goldie, 2000; Helm,
2001; Döring and Peacocke, 2002; Stephan and Slaby, 2011), and how these form an
integrative unity in processes of evaluative self- and world-disclosure, in particular.
types of signiﬁcance or import, which are instantiated in a speciﬁc
situation. Thus, experiencing a particular type of evaluative state
is equivalent to experiencing signiﬁcance, to which a particular
valence is always integral. This valence dimension has been exem-
plarily discussed with regard to the emotions, in particular, for its
motivating role (e.g., Helm, 2010, 2001, 99ff). These experiences –
that something or someone is experienced as having import, is
of signiﬁcance or is experienced as meaningful – are not solely
provided by the reﬂective sphere, e.g., in virtue of self-reﬂexive
processes (e.g., in terms of “caring,” cf. Frankfurt, 1988; Jacobs,
2012, pp. 219–228), but also by the pre-reﬂective sphere, e.g., in
terms of bodily appraisals (cf. Prinz, 2004, p. 77, 173) and other
bodily corporal processes that positively or negatively reinforce
individual practice of meaningful relatedness.
THE EXPERIENTIAL UNITY
The constitution of a phenomenal unity and its respective situa-
tional occurrence in the experience of a particular evaluative states
then can be explained the following way: certain types of evalua-
tive states are linkedwith evaluative concepts and their respectively
embedded propositional content, which form the underlying
“core”-intentional structure of an particular evaluative state; while
the whole narration (e.g., in form of an oral or written report)
conveys the structure of that evaluative content. The “evaluative
narratives” are the more ﬁne-grained structures, which contribute
to the narrative coherence of the more “robust,” single evalua-
tive concepts of evaluative experience (cf. Slaby, 2008, p. 274).
Such evaluative concepts (like, for instance, “threatening,” “dan-
gerous,” etc.) that relate to the formal object (e.g., psychopath) of
the respective evaluative type (e.g., anxiety) thereby amount to the
all-encompassing conceptual structure of a particular evaluative state
(e.g., of an emotion), which is expressed (e.g., communicated) in
narration. Consequently, one can also account for the structural
connectivity of different evaluative states in complex evaluative
situations by pointing to narrativity as an adequate structuring
principle. Then the complex phenomenality and intentionality
of different types of evaluations become integrated into the all-
encompassing conceptualmeta-structure of one’s evaluative situation
as a whole. This refers to a synthesis according to which different
experiential modes of evaluation become structurally interrelated
in complex evaluative experience. Experiencing, e.g., anxiety when
standing face to face with a psychopath then becomes structurally
connected with isochronally occurring evaluative experience, for
instance, with the desire to run away, the belief that one has to pro-
tect the child one hides behind one’s back, with bodily feelings of
being close to collapsing, etc., according to which someone’s actual
evaluative situation enfolds. This strengthens the hypothesis of a
procedural dynamics of evaluation, i.e., it points to the continu-
ous processes by which the evaluative structure of one’s existential
situation develops and by which one experientially traverses one’s
actual existential situation in multifaceted modes of meaningful
relatedness.
THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM AND DEPRESSION
Although there are alternative ways to conceptualize the unity of
evaluative experience, and albeit I do not claim narrativity to be a
necessary condition for the conceptualization of the experiential
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synthesis in evaluative experience, it presents as a quite reason-
able paradigm; especially, if one aims to explain the (structural)
changes in depressive evaluation. One can describe on a concep-
tual level, how particular experiences of evaluative incoherence
can be traced back to inconsistencies (typical deformations) in
the evaluative structure itself. These cause “fragmentations” of
the experiential unity in processes of evaluative self- and world-
disclosure in depression4. Very often, such fragmentations of the
experiential unity are already reﬂected in the incoherent styles
of writing and speech in depressed patients (cf. Hilken, 1993;
Hunsaker Hawkins, 1999). As such, pathography (Möbius, 1907)
provides a very good insight to recurrent and signiﬁcantly altered
evaluative patterns of experiences in psychopathology (cf. Haber-
mas, 2011). Consequently, I refer to narratives of depression to
exemplify such experiences of evaluative incoherence. These may
put some ﬂesh to the conceptual bone of “depressive situatedness.”
Moreover, narration is a particular type of sense-making-
practice, in which evaluative content (experiences of import) is
transformed – e.g., by verbal expression – to a speech act, and,
as such, provides one way to address how evaluative experience
instantiates and expresses in individual meaningful practice. The
important role it plays in processes of coping, identity forma-
tion (cf. Bruner, 2001; Habermas, 2012) and self-knowledge (cf.
Bruner, 1987) points also to a therapeutic value of the narrative
paradigm (cf. Richert, 2006). This already has been pointed out
by Freud (1905, p. 7) who characterizes neuroses as “gaps” in
autobiographic narratives.
Given the plausibility of such a holistic, dynamical perspec-
tive on the individual evaluative setting, my analysis afﬁrms a
synthesis-view as essential for a description of experiential and
practical changes of meaningful relatedness in depression.
THE DEPRESSIVE SITUATION – CHANGES OF PRACTICAL
SENSE AND MEANINGFUL RELATEDNESS
It is next outlined what characterizes the depressive situation. I
suggest that those processes in which different types of evalua-
tion/evaluative states normally become structurally interrelated
and integrated to consistent evaluative patterns for self- and
world-disclosure are more prone to distortion in depressive as in
healthy individuals. I focus in the following on how the otherwise
“smooth” and ﬂexible procedural dynamics of evaluation – denot-
ing the openness of one’s existential situation – come unstuck and
therein amount to symptomatic depressive experiences of changes
of meaningful relatedness, i.e., to particular experiences of evalua-
tive incoherence and incapacity. These are addressed as distortions
of practical sense in depression.
EXISTENTIAL OPENNESS AND ITS RESTRICTION IN DEPRESSION
Inasmuch as we situate ourselves in the world in ongoing processes
of evaluative self- and world-disclosure, our existential situation
4Inasmuch asmy account focuses on experiences of fragmentation due to signiﬁcant
structural changes in the evaluative processes in depression, it is evident that I do
not stipulate such fragmentations as the experiential norm. It has to be discussed
elsewhere, whether emphasizing on the latter would require to reconsider narrativity
to be a necessary structuring principle, as it is, for instance, suggested by Ricoeur
(1996, p. 174), who emphasizes on“discordance concordance”that likewise accounts
for a synthesis of heterogeneous aspects of one’s evaluative situation in virtue of
narrativity as a (necessary) structuring principle.
normally remains receptive for experiential changes and different
modes for meaningful relatedness, respectively. In contrast, the
depressive situation rather points to the opposite of an existential
openness.
Generally, one’s meaningful self-world-relation evolves out
of the proceeding dynamics of the pre-reﬂective and reﬂective
evaluative spheres that provide the evaluative architecture of the
existential situation. With these procedural dynamics one can, for
instance, account for the coming and going of different evaluative
states in a speciﬁc situation, as well as for the individual variances
in evaluative reactions to the very same event, i.e., how individu-
als ﬂexibly adapt to contextual constraints in a speciﬁc situation.
In the continuous processes of registering, adopting, maintaining,
reﬂecting or rejecting certain beliefs, desires, feelings, fantasies,
values, ideals, etc. one navigates through the world as an evaluative
being in more or less meaningful ways.
Habitual attunements
It has to be mentioned that a set of relatively stable (not rigid!)
evaluative patterns for self-understanding and world-orientation
become individually acquired. These evaluative patterns form a
habitual evaluative repertoire that narrow a total existential open-
ness, as it terminates the individual space of evaluative possibilities
to a realm of actual evaluative capacity an individual has in spe-
ciﬁc situations. It naturally determines, for instance, the range of
actions that might count as reasonable to one in a speciﬁc situa-
tion, and someone’s evaluative responsiveness to a certain event. As
such, these evaluative patterns already provide a (pre-)normative
basis according to which we come to appraise (pre-)reﬂectively
whatmakes sense to us orwhat is of importance in speciﬁc contexts
of social interaction. This evaluative repertoire can also become
the object of reﬂection, for instance, in processes of contemplation
about the values, ideals, concerns, etc. that oftendeeply impregnate
one’s self-understanding and world-orientation.
Inasmuch as the existential situation in principle remains
receptive to the changes of the evaluative structure, an essential
structural requirement is provided for not experiencing oneself as
fundamentally exposed to these processes. We normally experi-
ence ourselves not as fully determined in thought, feeling, desire,
and by our bodily (pre-)dispositions, but rather as autonomous,
thus, responsible agents (cf. Jacobs, 2012, 2013a). In contrast, the
depressive situation is often shaped by the experiences of being exis-
tentially exposed, particularly,whendepressive individuals register
how their meaningful relation to the world, to others and their
self-understanding has signiﬁcantly changed. Such a decrease of
existential openness exhibits, for instance, in a generally reduced
sense for one’s actual possibilities in life, e.g., due to a changed
outlook on the world ﬁltered by negative bias. It reveals in experi-
ences of evaluative incoherence, for instance, in moments of being
torn between conﬂicting desires, emotions, and in particular expe-
riences of failures of intentional action (i.e., speciﬁc inabilities), or
problematic coping strategies for dealing with such experiences of
“losing grip” on one’s life.
Depressive situation and (evaluative) incapacity
It is generally useful to differentiate between different realms of
(in)capacity for a systematization of speciﬁc types of impairments
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involved in psychopathology,while the concept of“evaluative inca-
pacity” is special for its integrative potential (Jacobs, 2012, 141f).
One can argue for conceptual primacy of evaluation/evaluative
incapacity in depression, insofar as speciﬁc affective/emotional,
conative/volitional, and cognitive/rational disturbances in depres-
sion either present as particular subtypes of evaluative incapacity
and/or signiﬁcantly contribute to it. This mirrors the conceptual
claim that the signiﬁcant changes in the evaluative structure in
depression, neither can perceived as exclusively based on irra-
tionality (it is not just a matter of false beliefs), nor exclusively
stemming from an emotional-affective, or predominantly volitive,
or mere bodily corporal dimension. Insofar as different kinds of
evaluations become interrelated and shape the special evaluative
architecture of the actual depressive situation, one can account
for different kinds of inabilities that specify the dimensions of
evaluative incapacity in depression.
A prominent way to address from a naturalistic perspective
on mental disorder what underlies such experiential and prac-
tical changes in depression is to refer to altered information
processing in depression. One can exemplarily stress on cog-
nitive bias5 (e.g., cf. Beck, 1963, 1987; Clark et al., 1999) in
reasoning and in processing of emotional information, includ-
ing attention and memory (e.g., cf. MacLeod et al., 1986; Williams
et al., 1997; Gotlib and Neubauer, 2000; Gotlib et al., 2004; Joor-
mann and Gotlib, 2007), and distortions in logical thinking (e.g.,
Ellis, 1962) in depressed individuals. These count either as vul-
nerability factors, or as already symptomatic for the depressive
situation. These descriptions of involved dysfunctional processes
provided by clinical research on depression can be related more
closely to the phenomenological analysis of depressive experi-
ence, insofar as these refer to the neuropsychological correlates.
In the following section, I address those as “pathogenic restric-
tions of existential openness” in depression. These restrictions
appear more speciﬁc in lights of these biases, for instance,
the “rigidity” of certain evaluative patterns for self- and world-
disclosure.
Depressive bias and rigid evaluative patterns
This rigidity can be explained in terms of negative biases which
have to be considered for both, their role in implementing the
rigidity on a structural level of evaluation, and for simultane-
ously representing it. Depressed individuals show a tendency to
focus explicitly and exclusively on their own alleged negative traits,
inabilities and failures. These biases already represent how certain
affects, beliefs and desires that formerly might have stood rather in
contrast to one’s evaluative patterns for self- and world-disclosure
and self-understanding, deeply inﬁltrate a persons’ evaluative sys-
tem and install a different evaluative dynamics. As such, biases
represent and contribute to a reduction of the existential situ-
ation to only a fractural amount of experiential and practical
possibilities for meaningful relatedness, as there have been before
the onset of depression. Many of the evaluative patterns that
have provided one with possible and actual modes for evaluative
5A bias is “a proclivity to take one direction over another which under same con-
ditions will lead to accuracy or realism, but under other conditions will lead to
inaccuracy”; while“distortion”implies something invariablywrong (cf. Power, 1991;
Power and Dalgleish, 2008, p. 247).
self- and world-disclosure so far lose their practical signiﬁ-
cance, because other evaluative pattern stake over the depressive
person’s life.
It has become transparent that not only speciﬁc feelings, but
also characteristic beliefs, i.e., their normative evaluative con-
tent (“I am a terrible, ugly, selﬁsh, unworthy, etc. person and
deserve to suffer”) and desires (“I just want to die”) together
with the evaluative bodily corporal rationale (e.g., psychomotor
agitation, pain, loss of appetite, etc. cf. DSM-IV-TR (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2000), are considered characteristic
types of evaluation that shape the self- and world-relation of the
depressed. Being in such a way attuned to the world, depressed
persons ﬁnd themselves evidenced by very single negative expe-
rience. These conﬁrm the structure of evaluation represented by
the biased view. Such experiences, and respective appraisals, loop
back, i.e., become re-incorporated, to the very evaluative structure
from which they have arisen. The development and manifesta-
tion of the depressive self- and world-relation follow the logic
of self-priming looping dynamics: the more one experiences and
behaves in a “depressed” way, the more these experiences become
woven into one’s personality structure, which then contributes
simultaneously to the (re-)production of certain behavioral pat-
terns. It is this kind of vicious circle by which the depressive
situation becomes manifest in rigid patterns for world- and
self-disclosure.
Besides vulnerability factors and individual difference in one’s
habitual (pre-)dispositions, of course, speciﬁc experiences, e.g.,
such of reinforcement by the environment and one’s own indi-
vidual practice of dealing with these experiences inﬂuence these
self-priming dynamics. In order to alter both, incorporation
and enacting of these structures, something from the “out-
side” has to come (e.g., therapeutic invention) or from the
“inside” (e.g., self-reﬂexivity or introspection) that may eventu-
ally re-shape these perpetuating dynamics. Consequently, it is
an aim of therapy to “crack” the structural rigidity in order to
alter the experiential and practical modes of relatedness stem-
ming from these so that depressed persons are able to restore a
kind of experiential and practical openness of their existential
situation.
The following quote illustrates that this may mean hard work,
as to be existentially situated in a non-depressive way often has
become literally unthinkable for the severely depressed. Alternative
modes of being related to the world stay out of experiential and
practical reach in feeling, thought, desire, embodiment and action:
“When you are depressed, the past and the future are
absorbed entirely by the present moment, as in the world of
a three-year-old. You cannot remember a time when you felt
better, at least not clearly; and you certainly cannot imag-
ine a future time when you will feel better. Being upset, even
profoundly upset, is a temporal experience, while depression
is a-temporal. Breakdowns leave you with no point of view.”
(Solomon, 2001,p. 55).
The quote from Solomon illustrates how the fundamental
restriction of one’s existential situation becomes transparent in
terms of temporality, too. The reverberation of a non-depressive
past and the anticipation of a future without having depression
are fundamentally restricted, as one sticks to the present moment,
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 429 | 6
“fpsyg-04-00429” — 2013/7/16 — 10:07 — page 7 — #7
Jacobs The depressive situation
which forms an isolated and disconnected experience of presence
(for detailed analysis of altered temporality in psychopathology,
see, e.g., cf. Bech, 1975; Ciompi, 1988; Mundt et al., 1998; Fuchs,
2001, 2005a, 2013; Habermas et al., 2008). As depression is often
a long-term condition, the “depressive” evaluative patterns can
become part of the habitual evaluative repertoire by means of
their structural rigidity, which then shapes the depressive habi-
tus6. With respect to the self-perpetuating evaluative dynamics by
which the depressive situation enfolds as a long-term condition,
a chronic disease management model for depression is needed
(cf. Andrews, 2001). At least, the high co-morbidity of depressive
symptoms with long-term conditions, e.g., diabetes (cf. Ander-
son et al., 2001), heart diseases, anxiety disorders (e.g., Paschalides
et al., 2004), and physical conditions with inﬂammatory processes
(cf. Harrison et al., 2009), point toward the relevance of perceiving
the depressive situation in lights of long-term impairment. This is
reﬂected in its conceptualization as a speciﬁc type of existential sit-
uation that challenges individuals to develop long-time oriented
coping strategies (cf. e.g., McEvoy and Barnes, 2007; Smit et al.,
2007; Naylor et al., 2012) to counterbalance the structural changes
of evaluation by which it manifests as a harmful condition of
existential narrowness.
(DISTORTIONS OF) PRACTICAL SENSE IN DEPRESSION
It is with respect to the openness of one’s existential situation
that one is able to re-evaluate and to readjust in the light of new
experiences and practice of sense-making.
“I can(not)”
Normally, we register when thingsmight (have) go(ne)wrong, and
when particular modes of meaningful relatedness become inher-
ently problematic. It is in virtue of practical sense, that we realize
the possibilities and restrictions, thus the opportunities and lim-
its for reassessment and readjustment in our life. The notion of
practical sense reminds us of that according to which the world
and self are perceived not solely in terms of an abstract “I think
that,” but in terms of an“I can”as Maurice Merleau-Ponty empha-
sizes in his Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
Part I, Chapter 3, §19, p. 159). Martin Heidegger (cf. Heidegger,
1962, 114, §18) expresses the idea that the world is perceived as a
place inwhich things appear to individuals not only as“present-at-
hand” (German: Vorhandenheit), but is normally experienced as a
place of (normative) affordances, according towhich things appear
to them as “ready-to-hand” (German: Zuhandenheit). Practical
sense apparently inﬂuences not only what we do in a speciﬁc sit-
uation, but signiﬁcantly contributes to how we are existentially
situated in the world, i.e., how we enact in and through processes
of pre-reﬂective and reﬂective evaluation, by which a particular
meaningful relation between self, others and the world is instan-
tiated (cf. Jacobs, 2013a). As such, it provides us also with modes
6With Bourdieu’s theory, the bodily disposition and speciﬁc gestures, postures and
body-language of depressive persons can be systematized and decoded as reﬂecting
the historicity and actuality of a depressed individual’s whole bio-psycho-social
status. These aspects of “depressive habitus” exemplarily have been detailed by
the German psychiatrist Hubertus Tellenbach, who addresses the habitual dimen-
sion of depression – inclusive its characteristic hexis – with his famous “Typus
Melancholicus” (cf. Tellenbach, 1961; see also Jaspers, 1913, 141–144; §5; Fuchs,
2006).
for readjustment, for coping and adaptation by implementing a
“world of possibilities.” This is also integral in Husserl’s (1960)
and Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) concepts of horizon, where the hori-
zontal structure of experience particularly points to how the body
sets up the world, and how this is implicated in someone’s particu-
lar experience of the world. Although many alterations of practical
sense cannot be labeled pathological per se, existential situations
of the pathological type very often include signiﬁcant distortions
of practical sense.
Evaluative incoherence in depression
In psychopathological conditions, like depression, such experi-
ences of being vitally connected to the world and others through
the body, which normally is a transparent medium for evaluative
self- and world-disclosure, can become severely distorted (cf. Sve-
naeus, 2000; Fuchs, 2005b,c) as the following quote from Solomon
illustrates:
“I found everything excruciatingly difﬁcult, and so, for exam-
ple, the prospect of lifting the telephone receiver seemed to
me like bench pressing four hundred pounds.” (Solomon, 2001,
p. 85)
This is one way to account for a distortion of practical sense
in depression. The question is, whether one can address on the
bodily corporal level a fragmentation of the experiential unity in
evaluative self- and world-disclosing processes with this exam-
ple: I believe that the experience of “difﬁculty” in this example,
indeed, reﬂects a type of experiencing evaluative incoherence.
The appraisal is not solely provided by reﬂective assessment,
but given in virtue of pre-reﬂective evaluative appraisals. Inco-
herence does play a role, insofar as one perceives the actual
bodily corporal condition (“I cannot”) always against the back-
drop of the condition (the bodily corporal “I can”) prior to
the onset of one’s depression. The incorporated sense of being
able to behave and to act as one normally does, becomes frag-
ile, i.e., corporal-bodily possibilities cannot be actualized in such
speciﬁc situations of being unable to even lift the telephone
receiver.
“Evaluative incoherence” also captures more severe cases of
estrangement, alienation, and evende-realization/depersonalization-
processes in depression. The experiential unity is fragmented in
such moments of experiencing oneself no longer the center of
one’s own perception or losing trust in these. Inasmuch as per-
ceiving oneself, others and the world in a particular way already
entails processes of evaluation, Thompson’s example of altered
self-awareness accounts for this distortionof the experiential unity,
too:
“I began to lose faith in my own perceptions. It was as if I were
standing in front of amirrorwhichwas gradually getting distorted;
eventually, what I saw bore little relationship to reality, but the
change had been so slow that I had no idea where the distortion
began.” (Thompson, 1996, pp. 125–126)
Another option to specify distortions of practical sense is to
point to the scenario in which the “I cannot” stems from being
overwhelmed by the sheer concomitance of evaluative experience
occurring in a speciﬁc situation, and/or from being torn by eval-
uative conﬂict. The more complex a situation is, the more likely
it is also that conﬂicting evaluative content (desire to kill oneself
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vs. desire to take care for one’s children) is present, and some-
times needs to be additionally assessed against the backdrop of
corresponding different evaluative types (a belief, that leaving
the children is selﬁsh vs. the feeling that nothing makes sense
any longer). On an experiential level, these evaluations demand
their structural integration into a consistent evaluative pattern
that allows for evaluative coherence.
Structural inconsistencies normally can be solved, e.g., in
self-reﬂexive processes, or simply resolve themselves due to
the (phenomenal-intentional) strength of a particular evaluative
type/evaluative pattern overriding the other(s), and thus, initi-
ates the respective experiential and practical mode of meaningful
relatedness. We often also stay in the particular evaluative state
of ambivalence, which clearly presents a different type of mean-
ingful relatedness as when one is stuck in the process of constant
rumination and indecisiveness, as it is seen as symptomatic for
depression (cf. DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association,
2000, p. 349; Watkins and Teasdale, 2001). The particular symp-
tomatic experiences can be explained in terms of distortions in
one’s self-reﬂexive evaluative processes. These become surface, for
instance, in a depressive person’s inability to afﬁrm or distance
oneself from certain thoughts, desires, or feelings and to adopt
an objectifying stance that normally would give one some time
to recognize what one really thinks, feels, desires in a speciﬁc sit-
uation. Even if one associates constant rumination with such a
self-reﬂexive stance, the ability to rank preferences, i.e., to cre-
ate a hierarchy of motives, according to which that what is of
importance, normally becomes clear to someone – seems impaired
in depression, as the symptom of depressive indecisiveness
suggests.
Being capable to decide is often perceived as a structural
requirement for effective deliberation, and thus signiﬁcantly con-
tributes to experience of not being fundamentally determined and
existentially exposed. Consequently, one could assume that if these
structural divergences in evaluation – which also presents them-
selves as divergences of import – remain unresolved, not only the
integrative unity in evaluative experience is put at risk (with Harry
Frankfurt we can even claim a distortion of the synchronic unity
of the self; cf. Frankfurt, 1988, 2006, p. 19), but in tendency also an
agent’s autonomy. In emphasizing on such moments of structural
evaluative inconsistency, and corresponding modes of incoherent
evaluative experience, an alteration of practical sense in depres-
sion is addressed, in which the “I cannot” shows in a distortion of
particular self-reﬂexive processes.
It can be objected, however, that there are many other ways
to specify an “I cannot” in depression, and that these examples,
moreover, show that it is misleading to tie evaluative incapacity
too close to speciﬁc clinical symptoms. This can be outlined by a
contrary case of depressive decisiveness. Imagine, for instance, the
situation in which the desire to kick the ladder on which one has
stood already for an hour with a rope around one’s neck, is neither
outplayed by the desire to be a good mom, nor by feelings of love
and sorrow for the children one would leave behind by commit-
ting suicide, and does not results in the decision to climb down the
ladder to prepare breakfast for them, but leads one to“wholeheart-
edly”kick the ladder and hang oneself. The evaluative incoherence
assumed as pressing in the situation, as such, is deﬁnitely solved.
Respectively, it seems to represent rather a classic case of “I can” in
depression, thus, rules out the description of evaluative incapacity
in virtue of the clinical symptoms provided above, too.
To my defense, it can be assumed that effective suicide is
frequently committed in phases of recovery (cf. Schweizer et al.,
1988; Mittal et al., 2009), thus, when it is likely that someone has
restored some psychic and physic resources, that may allow one to
effectively deliberate, in contrast to those phases when one cannot
even perform the simplest tasks of daily life. Moreover, one may
doubt, whether this example really can account for an intact prac-
tical sense, albeit an “I can” is involved. The example shows that
a depressed individual may be able to decide, but is not able to
care for oneself, for other people, and for the things that have been
close to one’s heart, at least in such ways that committing suicide
remains the “unthinkable” option.
The example further illustrates that the “I cannot” generally
allows not only for many ways to account for evaluative inco-
herence and particular types of incapacity, but to generally state
evaluative incoherence and (in)capacity in depression as a matter
of degree. It points toward the in-between of the twopoles of global
incapacity (e.g., absolute indecisiveness) vs. fully intact capac-
ity (e.g., “wholeheartedly” committing suicide). I do not argue,
indeed, that depressives generally face global evaluative incapacity,
but that they apparently show a diminished coping ﬂexibly with
such stresses and strains on the evaluative structure by which the
challenging normative aspects of complex evaluative situations
become transparent.
THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF THE DEPRESSIVE
SITUATION
By relying on the notion of practical sense, one can further
elaborate, how individuals calibrate their individual experiences
of signiﬁcance (Sinn) with those objective patterns of meaning
(Bedeutung) that deﬁne what actually “makes sense” in speciﬁc
contexts. As such, practical sense illustrate show subjective evalu-
ative patterns for self- and world-disclosure become interrelated
with the objective evaluative patterns of meaningful (social) prac-
tice. To be more precise: the mediating function of practical sense
provides one not only with a sense for one’s own individual
evaluative situation in terms of an “I can” (I have addressed else-
where with a sense of agency cf. Jacobs, 2012), but also with
an understanding of it in relation to those patterns of mean-
ing generated in processes of inter-subjective practice (cf. Jacobs,
2013b). Individuals are able to recognize the respective patterns
of meaning generated in and through social interaction, and,
simultaneously, register how they ﬁt into that. They experience
how their individual meaningful practice matches or mismatches
actual contextual (conventional, moral, social, etc.) requirements
and standards of inter-subjective practice (e.g., what it means
to be a good mom, and what sense it makes to commit sui-
cide). It is with respect to practical sense that one counterbalances
one’s evaluative experience andpractice against the pre-descriptive
(normative) sphere of meaning in the respective ﬁelds of social
practice. With respect to modes of (re-)adjustment this implies
that we do not only ask what we actually can do, but what
should be all things considered the best way to do. Practical
sense therein refers to more than what is captured with an “I
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can,” as particularly the normative dimension of evaluative encoun-
ters with the world in terms of an “I should” becomes addressed
with it7 .
One should note that meaningful relatedness does not have
to automatically merge into the experience of a mere match of
individual evaluation (e.g., moral judgment) with objective evalu-
ative patterns (e.g., moral rules). There are several other modes of
meaningful relatedness that rather rely on distinction (as Bourdieu,
1979 emphasizes) by which one can stress (habitual) evaluative
divergence and difference as essential for one’s self-understanding
and one’s world-orientation, too. Depressed individuals certainly
experience themselves as distinct, but it would often be cynical
to account for these experiences as modes of distinctive practice
that normally are powerful tools for positioning oneself in the
ﬁelds of social practice. Patricia Dunker reﬂects this in her novel
Hallucinating Foucault :
“And that is the loneliness of seeing a different world from
that of the people around you. Their lives remain remote from
yours. You can see the gulf and they can’t. You live among
them. They walk the earth. You walk on glass. They reassure
themselves with conformity, with carefully constructed resem-
blances. You are masked, aware of your absolute difference.”
(Dunker, 1996, p. 110).
This points to a speciﬁc subclass of normative conﬂict in
depression, in which the imperatives of an “I should” (in
terms of incorporated social, cultural, moral, etc. structures)
stand in conﬂicting relation with particular experiences of an
“I cannot” – as the case example of suicide has exemplarily
shown – that forms a fundamental source of suffering. This is
addressed in many prominent depression narratives (e.g., Plath,
1963, p. 102, 137; Styron, 1990, p. 38; Thompson, 1996,
p. 47, 57), and described also in the following passage by
Solomon:
“[...] I would sometimes start to cry again, weeping not only
because of what I could not do, but because the fact that I could
not do it seemed so idiotic to me. All over the world people were
taking showers. Why, of why, could I not be one of them? And
then I would reﬂect that those people also had families and jobs
and bank accounts and passports and dinner plans and prob-
lems, real problems, cancer and hunger and the death of their
children and isolating loneliness and failure; and I had so few
problems by comparison, except that I couldn’t turn over again.
[...]Always at the back of my mind there was a voice, calm and
clear, that said, don’t be so maudlin; don’t do anything melodra-
matic. […] get dressed, and do whatever it is that you’re supposed
to do. I heard that voice all the time, that voice like my mother’s.
There was a sadness and a terrible loneliness as I contemplated
what was lost.” (Solomon, 2001, pp. 52–53; emphasis added
K. J.).
Depressed individuals experiences themselves not only as
deprived of the resources to deal ﬂexibly with the stresses and
strains on their evaluative structure arising out of an “I cannot”;
7The notion of practical sense therein contributes to an understanding of social, par-
ticularly: moral practice. A lack of moral sense (moral incapacity) can be addressed
as a subtype of distortion of practical sense to experience oneself as meaningfully
(morally) related to others (cf. Jacobs, 2012, 2013a).
they simultaneously know – or at least, remember – that they
normally could or even should have performed in a speciﬁc way
that once was experienced as meaningful, as a quote from Duke
and Hochman illustrates:
“Those periods when I stayed in bed, behind closed doors for
all those weeks, I felt dirty, smelly. Part of me thought I should
get up and wash myself, and then I would dismiss that because I
couldn’t get up. My thoughts would vary from blaming others to
wishing for the absolutely unattainable peace of mind. And also
thoughts of:Why is this happening to me? Why am I like this? I’m a
terrible person.” (Duke and Hochman, 1992, Chapter 7, paragraph
19; emphasis added K. J)
Consequently, the distortion of practical sense points to the
problematic evaluative self-relation that does not allow for the
experiential and practical modes of transcending the depressive
situation in light of an existential openness; it rather harmfully
reminds one that experiencing oneself, others and the world as
meaningful points of reference, has lost most of its practical
signiﬁcance.
CONCLUSION
I have examined the depressive situation as a speciﬁc type of exis-
tential situation and emphasized the procedural dynamics of the
pre-reﬂective and reﬂective spheres of evaluation, narrativity as a
structuring principle for the experiential unity in evaluative pro-
cesses, processes of evaluative disintegration and experiences of
evaluative incoherence, and how these appear as distortions of
practical sense in depression. First person accounts of depres-
sion from the memoirs genre served to illustrate these contexts.
These have evidenced changes of meaningful relatedness indepres-
sion in pointing to recurrent experiential patterns of evaluative
incoherence and incapacity, and moreover to the normative chal-
lenges associated with these. It seems that some of the phenomena
I have discussed should be given more attention in diagnostic-
clinical theory and practice. Although these may not share the
grounds of operationalization, and respective validity and relia-
bility as claimed for the ofﬁcial criteria listed in the diagnostic
manuals, they may be of diagnostic value in addition to the cur-
rent criteria. It is, moreover, another issue to show how such
phenomenological descriptions of evaluative experience can be
emphasized more in the context of future empirical research that
aims to single out the neuropsychological correlates of the com-
plex dynamics of pre-reﬂective and reﬂective evaluative self- and
world-disclosing processes, and how these can substantiate some
considerations of characteristic distortions in depression that
have been discussed.
Although my analysis is restricted in scope, I believe that I
have provided some reasons to accept that a holistic perspective
on (changes in) evaluative processes in depression may contribute
to a better understanding of its characteristic modes of self- and
world-disclosure.
Future research will focus on an even more detailed analysis
of salient changes of meaningful relatedness in psychopathol-
ogy, especially with respect to the bodily corporal dynamics
as constitutive for processes of normative self- and world-
disclosure. A related methodological topic is to continue relating
phenomenological considerations closer to empirical research and
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normative considerations about such speciﬁc concepts as agency,
capacity, and autonomy, which are central to the notion of
existential situation.
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